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Introduction
Despite advances in understanding the policies that cause inflation, economists
know little about inflation’s manifestations and transmission in the marketplace.  For
example, how does inflation affect wages in an economy composed of heterogeneous
agents making individual optimizing decisions?  We know that there is a wide dispersion
of wage changes in any year (Groshen and Schweitzer 1998).  In this paper we ask
whether inflation and its changes alter the distribution of wage shocks—rather than being
neutral for the distribution as conventional theories of wage adjustment would suggest.
Distributional effects on wage changes have been the subject of conjecture by
academic, policy, and business economists, but rarely the subject of systematic inquiry.
Altered distributions in the presence of inflation would indicate that simple wage
models—i.e., ones based on representative or aggregate agents—are inadequate to
describe the complexity of wage determination.  Initially, characterizing the nature of this
complexity allows us to identify the variety of labor-market responses to shocks.  From
there, we can develop and evaluate richer models of the wage-setting process.
Insights into the distribution of wage changes should also be helpful for
monitoring the economy.  For example, one question of particular current interest is
whether the wage-setting process during the 1990s (a period noted for both low inflation
and unemployment rates) differed from historical patterns.  Another interesting question
is whether some subset of jobs tends to react first to inflationary or deflationary stimuli.
For our investigation of these questions, we examine a long (39-year) time series
of wages for a panel of mobile occupations for a set of employers in three Midwestern3
cities.  We study wage changes during years with rising, falling, and steady inflation to
identify regularities that could broaden our understanding of the inflationary process at
the micro level.
Inflation (as measured by changes in the Consumer Price Index) and nominal
wage growth (as measured in the means of the data set we study, as well as in national
series) are largely co-timed.  In this paper, we treat wage changes as caused by inflation.
This approach does not reflect a stand on whether inflation is primarily a price-pull or
cost-push phenomenon.  Rather, this perspective reflects the experience of inflation from
the individual worker or firm’s point of view.
That is, our approach is consistent with how human resource managers (the agents
who propose and justify pay increases in most large U.S. firms) describe their salary-
adjustment policies.  Personnel managers typically report that they use local cost-of-living
increases and the wages paid by other employers to guide their wage adjustments.
Though potentially compatible with many economic theories of wage adjustment
(including firms’ price-taking in labor markets), these policies suggest that wage changes
react to inflation instead of driving it.  At a macroeconomic level, the managers’ policies
should tend to tie pay increases to inflation and productivity growth on a lagging or
contemporaneous basis.
The paper proceeds as follows.  First we describe the wage-setting process in large
firms and discuss the reasons why wage change distributions may not be neutral with
respect to inflation.  Then we describe the data.  The fourth section describes our main
results on the distributional effects of inflation.  To test for robustness, we also consider
the impact of unemployment and changes in returns to education on wage-change4
distributions.  The fifth section investigates two policy-relevant questions: whether some
jobs tend to be the first to respond to changes in inflation, and whether wage changes in
the 1990s have deviated from historical patterns.  The sixth section summarizes and
concludes.
Inflation in the Labor Market – The Agents’ Perspectives
In this section, we describe the wage-setting practices of large U.S. employers,
such as those observed in the CSS.  Large employers are of particular interest for this
study because they provide a majority of jobs (over half and not shrinking) in the U.S.
labor market.  In addition, their behavior is more likely to deviate from the competitive
price-taking model than are small firms’ actions.
Wage-Setting Practices in Large Firms
Inflation affects the labor market by influencing workers’ expectations and firms’
wage-setting practices and compensation schemes.  In economies with competitive labor,
capital, and product markets, comparable workers at equivalent jobs should be
compensated similarly.
1  If an employer sets wages too low, employee morale and
productivity may suffer, and turnover may rise—all resulting in lower profits.  If an
employer pays too much, however, it will also experience lower profits or have to lay off
workers because it will be unable to price products competitively and still be profitable.
Thus, inflation is a key factor in workers’ and firms' wage setting.
                                                
1  Compensation includes wages, benefits, and working conditions.  For simplicity, we focus on
wages in this analysis.  Wages are the largest and most flexible part of compensation and are most subject to
the effects of inflation.5
The annual wage-setting process in a large firm typically has two stages.  In the
first stage, an employer’s senior management sets the average wage change for its work
force—to reflect inflation forecasts, labor market surveys, and projections of sales and
product prices.
2  Management aims to maintain the company’s profitability by not over-
or underpaying employees to prevent both excessively high labor costs and unwanted
turnover.  Many employers pursue this goal by maintaining some ongoing desired parity
with other employers.
During the second stage, each corporate division allocates its share of the salary
budget among its workers to match market wages and reward performance. Employers
often need to reconfigure wage differences among occupations in their divisions to
respond to external influences.  In a competitive labor market, an occupation’s wages
reflect the amount and kind of training necessary, working conditions, and whether such
workers are in short supply compared to the firms’ need for them.  These circumstances
can change as technology, products, demographics, or input prices shift.
Why Inflation Affects the Distribution of Wage Shocks
The process described above can be incorporated into a formal wage-setting
model that allows for period-by-period heterogeneity in wages and their changes.
3
Crucially, though, as long as individuals optimize over leisure and consumption, a
general, observed increase in the price level will shift the wage-change distribution
                                                
2 In a unionized company, wage determination also involves negotiation with union leaders and a
long (usually three-year) time horizon.
3 One example would be the Sparks (1986) model, which is itself a generalization of efficiency
wage models of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).6
equivalently for all firms.  This uniform response to inflation is characteristic of any wage
determination model with representative or aggregate agents.
Hence, we must move beyond simple representative or aggregate agents to find
factors that make the distribution of wage changes sensitive (non-neutral) with respect to
inflation.  We posit three main sources.  First, if the firms’ inflation outlooks differ, their
wage changes will differ (if contracting is nominal and fixed for a period of time).  Any
employer’s mistakes in projecting product price growth shows up uniformly in the wages
of all its workers.
Second, nominal wages may be rigid.  That is, workers may experience a discrete
rise in the disutility of their effort after nominal wage cuts.  This story is consistent with
prevalence of nominally-priced contracts in the U.S. economy.  If firms do avoid nominal
wage cuts, the workers most affected are those whose occupation gets a negative shock,
no matter what type of firm they are in.  So, in an economy with downward rigidity, the
variance of occupational wage changes rises with the level of inflation—until the rigidity
no longer binds.
Finally, business-cycle phenomenon may alter the supply of workers in other ways
that are correlated with inflation—yielding further non-neutralities in the distribution of
wage changes.
Have Things Changed in the 1990s?
Two schools of thought argue that wage setting during the 1990s has been
different than in previous years.  One set of analysts suggests that workers have become
more insecure since the 1980s, because of employer downsizing and the elimination of7
lifetime jobs in the U.S.  The other points to changes due to the persistence of the low-
inflation environment.
According to a recent series of articles in the New York Times, the leading
explanation of why inflation has been so limited these last three years—despite low
unemployment rates—is that wage demands have been held down by an unusually high
degree of “worker uncertainty.”
4 Substantial research effort has gone into identifying and
disputing the sources of this presumed insecurity in the face of a buoyant labor market.
The most commonly mentioned reasons include the threat of middle-management layoffs,
competition with foreign workers, and less unionization.  These factors could reduce
wage inflation by making workers think twice before requesting higher wages, even if
their firms’ balance sheets have improved.
If this is the case, then some employers that in the past would have maintained or
elevated their market wage position, no longer feel the need to do so.  In an efficiency
wage model, alternative employers are exogenously less attractive to workers, so the
efficiency wage firms’ offers should fall—resulting in smaller nominal wage increases
than typical.  Thus, lower wage increases may occur more often or be associated with
different conditions than in the past.
Alternatively, others have argued that wage setting has been altered by the
persistence of very low inflation (below 3 percent).  In a low-inflation environment,
competition could pressure participants to accept more flexible practices—particularly
                                                
4 Peter Passell, “A Pulse that Lingers,” The New York Times, July 22, 1997, p. A18
practices that permit nominal pay cuts.  Examples of such innovations already exist and
would proliferate, such as bonus and incentive pay, and contingent contracts.
Widespread use of such pay schemes would overcome the constraints of
downward nominal wage rigidity, allowing lower overall wage changes.  In addition, the
lowest wage changes for particular occupations within firms might be less restricted—
that is, lower than expected, based on previous patterns.
The Community Salary Survey
This study uses annual private salary data from a survey that the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland has conducted in Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh since 1927 to
assist its annual salary budget process.  The analysis data set reports wages for detailed
occupations, by employer from 1957 through 1996.
The data set has three major selling points for this study.  First, the wages
recorded here are less prone to random reporting error than household data because they
are derived from administrative records.  Second, the data are longer-lived than any
source previously investigated.  Third, because employer data records wages in the way
most meaningful to firms, it is preferable to household or aggregate data for studying
impacts on the firms’ wage setting.  This perspective appropriately reflects the strategies
used by firms to adjust wage bills (e.g., promotions, reassignments or reorganization), but
not the potentially confounding means used by individual workers to adjust their earnings
(e.g., taking second jobs or changing hours).9
Table 1 describes the dimensions of the CSS wage-change data set.  From wage
levels, we compute 73,094 annual wage changes for occupation-employer (job) cells
observed in adjacent years.
5 Each observation gives the change in the log of the mean or
median salary for all individuals employed in an occupation-employer cell.  Since
medians should be more robust to outliers yet only means were recorded before 1974, our
results use means through 1974 and medians for the years thereafter.
 6 Cash bonuses are
included as part of the salary, although fringe benefits are not.
Participants in each city are chosen to be representative of large employers in the
area.  Until 1995, the number of companies participating trended up from 66 to over 80
per year (see Table 2).  On average, they stay in the sample for almost 13 years each.
Since each participant judges which establishments to include in the survey, depending on
its internal organization, we use "employer," a purposely vague term, to mean the
employing firm, establishment, division, or collection of local establishments for which
the participating entity chooses to report wages.
7 The industries included vary widely,
                                                
5 Job-cell-year observations where the calculated change in log wages exceeds 0.50 in absolute
value are deleted from the sample on the assumption that most of these arise from reporting or recording
errors.  Over 1,000 observations are imputed from cases where job-cells are observed two years apart.  The
imputed one-year changes are simply half of the two-year differences.  Many of the results reported here
were also run without the imputed observations.  Their inclusion does not affect the results.
6 Comparison of the coefficients estimated separately for means and medians for some years where
both were available (1974 and 1981-1990) suggests that they are highly correlated (correlation coefficients
of .97 to .99).  Coefficients estimated with medians show more variation than those estimated on means and
are more highly correlated over time, however this is consistent with medians being a more robust
measurement of central tendency.
7 Some include workers in all branches in the metropolitan area; others report wages for only the
office surveyed.  Since a participant's choice of the entities to include presumably reflects those for which
wage policies are actually administered jointly, the ambiguity here is not particularly troublesome.10
although the emphasis is on obtaining employers with many employees in the occupations
surveyed.
8
The occupations surveyed (43 to 100 each year) are exclusively nonproduction
jobs that are found in most industries, with relatively high inter-firm mobility, and well-
developed markets.
9 Many occupations are divided into grade levels, reflecting
responsibility and experience.  In the analysis, to avoid unnecessary restrictions, we
consider each occupational grade in each city to be a separate occupation.  Thus, the total
number of occupations in Table 2 exceeds the number surveyed during any given year.
For example, 83 occupational grades were surveyed in 1996, yielding 240 occupations
across the three cities.  On average, each employer reports wages for about 27
occupations.
Although the CSS is conducted annually, the month surveyed has changed several
times.  Throughout the paper, results for any year refer to the time between the preceding
survey and the one conducted in that year—usually a 12-month span, but occasionally
not.  When we examine data means for periods longer or shorter than a year, we annualize
the changes so they can be compared directly across years.  All data merged have been
adjusted to the extent possible to reflect time spans consistent with those in the CSS.  We
have repeated most of the exercises reported in this paper on the subset of years that
covered exactly a year and find no qualitative difference in results.
                                                
8 The employers surveyed include government agencies, banks, manufacturers, wholesalers,
retailers, utilities, universities, hospitals, and insurance firms.
9 They include office (e.g., secretaries and clerks), maintenance (e.g., mechanics and painters),
technical (e.g., computer operators and analysts), supervisory (e.g., payroll and guard supervisors), and
professional (e.g., accountants, attorneys, and economists) occupations.  Job descriptions for each are at
least two paragraphs long.11
We also incorporate standard measures of inflation and national output-per-hour
in our analysis (see Table 3).  As a measure of general inflation experienced in the
country, we use percentage changes in the monthly averages of the Consumer Price Index
for all Urban Workers (CPI).  Our labor productivity measure is the Nonfarm Business
Sector Output per Hour Worked (pre-chain-weights).
In order to investigate the distribution of wage adjustments under different
inflationary environments, we use two schemes to differentiate among years.  First, we
label all years as years of increasing, stable or decreasing inflation, using a ±0.5% cutoff
for the CPI.  For example, years when the inflation rate rose by more than 0.5 percentage
points are considered years of increasing inflation.  Second, we identify multi-year
episodes of inflationary changes as periods where the economy experienced two or more
consecutive years of increasing, stable or decreasing rates of inflation.  Table 4 shows
how the years under investigation (1957-1996) are categorized by these criteria.
As a check for our results focusing on business cycle variables, we also control for
the long-run rise in earnings inequality.  Limited earnings inequality measures are
available for the full period of this paper, 1957 to 1996.  The best measures available are
median earnings by education level.  Even this series is missing a few years during the
1950s.  We interpolate to fill in these gaps on the justification that these controls are
offered to account for long run trends.12
Wage Adjustments and Inflation
Mean CSS Wage Changes and Inflation
Figure 1 confirms that CSS wage changes are generally synchronized with
inflation.  The correlation between the mean CSS wage adjustment and inflation (CPI) is
high (0.82).  Overall, though, CSS wage growth has a higher mean (by 0.37) than the CPI,
because it includes the benefits of productivity growth.  Recent wage growth has
averaged much closer to the inflation rate (wage growth led by only 0.08 percentage
points in the 1990s).  From 1990 to 1996 mean wage growth was 1.7 percentage points
lower than the sum of inflation and productivity growth, versus 1.3 percentage points
lower over the full sample.  This suggests that the early 1990s had somewhat weaker than
usual wage growth, given inflation and the measured gains in productivity.
As for timing, at the annual frequency of CSS data, wages and prices can be
described reasonably as changing contemporaneously.  Compared to the
contemporaneous correlation between inflation and mean wage growth of 0.82, the
correlations are substantially lower for wage growth leading inflation by one year (0.59)
or two years (0.35).  The alternative—that wage growth follows inflation—is better
supported.  The correlation with wage growth lagging inflation by one year is 0.83.  It
falls to 0.69 with a two-year lag.  It also is clear that during particular periods, wage
growth exceeded inflation or CPI growth, with or without subsequent increases in the
inflation rate.  Overall, this source of detailed wage data supports a relationship between
wage growth, inflation and productivity growth, at least at an aggregate level.13
Inflation and the Dispersion of Wage Changes
Figure 2 relates the distribution of log wage changes in the CSS to the CPI during





th percentile log wage changes for cells in the
CSS.  If inflation were neutral with respect to the distribution of wage changes, there
would be no relationship between the level of inflation and the widening of the gap
between the top and bottom lines on the figure.  We would expect the lines to roughly
parallel the level of inflation.  Instead, the quantile lines show a marked tendency to
widen as the level of inflation rises.
For example, in 1996, the inflation rate was 3.0%.  In the CSS that year, the
median cell had a wage change of 3.4%, while the 10
th and 90
th percentiles had wage
changes of –4.7% and 12.5%, respectively.  Thus, factors that affect the size of percentile
wage changes increase the value of a good shock or a bad one in a particular year.
One aspect of interest for interpreting our findings is whether wage changes are
correlated with wage levels.  If the dispersion of wages remained constant over time, we
would expect no correlation between wage levels and changes.  Wages in the CSS,
however, like those in other US data sources, show a recent widening inequality (Groshen
1991).  Thus, the overall correlation coefficient between log wage levels and changes in
the CSS is 0.13.  Annually, the correlations range from 0.33 in 1977 down to 0.06 in
1982.  Thus, in all years, higher-wage workers tended to receive bigger proportional
raises than did low-wage workers.  Yet the correlation is fairly low, so our findings say14
more about what drives the size of good and bad wage shocks than about what happens to
good versus bad jobs.
How Inflation Affects Wage Gains in the Tails
To formally test for and explore the impact of inflation on wage change
distributions, we use quantile regressions of wage changes on various measures of
inflation and other controls.  Quantile regressions (developed by Koenker and Basset
[1978]) estimate the correlates of wage changes in various parts of the distribution.
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yi and xij are the i
th observation of the dependent and independent variables.  bj is a vector
of regression parameters.  The estimates are for quantile of interest, q.
The predictions of the estimator are the expected change in wages at the q
th quantile
conditional on the values of the independent variables xij.
Thus, we can distinguish between conditions which raise (or lower) the upper-end
wage changes, and those that primarily affect lower-end wage changes.  If the estimated
model were parameterized identically over the distribution of wage changes, then an OLS
regression would yield very similar coefficients.  Indeed, this is the reason that the
median regression often is recommend as a robust (less susceptible to outliers) alternative
to OLS regression.15
Koenker and Basset (1982) show that differences in parameter estimates at
alternative quantiles convert into a very general test for heteroscedasticity.  The test offers
advantages over more common tests because it is robust to non-Gaussian errors.  We
prefer it because the quantile estimators help elucidate the nature of the heterogeneity.
The test statistic (interested readers are referred to Koenker and Bassett [1982] for the
formula), focuses on whether coefficient differences are significant given the quantile
estimator measure of distribution of residuals.
We report three sets of results, with increasing complexity.  The first set shows
the simplest estimates—for the effect of CPI inflation alone.  Under the null hypothesis of
inflation’s neutrality on the distribution of wage changes, we expect a coefficient of one
on the level of inflation for every quantile.  In the next set of regressions, we also include
inflation’s square, to allow for nonlinearity.  Under the null, the coefficient on this should
be zero for all quantiles.  Two additional variables capture any incremental influence of
the level of inflation when inflation is falling (by more than 0.5 percentage points) or
rising.  Under the null, these coefficients should also be zero.  In addition, we include the
unemployment rate, the change in the unemployment rate, output per hour and its square
in the regressions to control for the business cycle and real wage gains.
Table 5 shows the simplest results.  The first row shows how the level of inflation
affects wage gains by quantile in the distribution of wage changes.  As expected, and as
we saw in Figure 2, wage changes in the 90
th percentile rise almost one-for-one with
inflation.  That is, the coefficient on CPI is 0.949.  Wage gains in the lower tails amount
to only a fraction of the inflation rate, however.  The corresponding coefficient for the16
10
th percentile is 0.067; showing surprisingly low sensitivity to changes in prices.  Thus,
the disparity between wage changes in the upper and lower tails rises with inflation.
Does this mean that the model predictions imply a growing disconnect between
wages levels and prices?  No, for two reasons.  1)  The estimates for the intercept term are
positive and statistically significant (except at the 25
th and 10
th percentiles), allowing
most wage changes keep up with the average level of inflation.  This combination results
in wage change predictions that are less variable than inflation, but similar in their mean
levels—as implied by Figure 2.  Estimated constants do decline from the 90
th to 10
th
percentile, preserving a distinct pattern of divergent outcomes.  2) The regression results
are for wage changes.  If the set of affected jobs vary substantially from period to period,
then being behind in one period may be made up in another.  This issue will be explored
in Section 5 of this paper.
While the apparent explanatory power of the regressions is fairly low—
particularly for the lower quantiles—we detect some very robust statistical relationships.
In evaluating the results, it is crucial to realize that the psuedo-R
2 we report is not directly
comparable to the traditional R
2.  This measure,
quantile raw about the deviations  weightedof sum
quantile estimated about the deviations  weightedof sum
1 pseudo
2 -=R ,
only approaches 1 when each observation is predicted as a conditional quantile.  Thus, the
estimator can yield accurate predictions of the quantile with a low psuedo-R
2, as long as
the weighted deviations are symmetric around the prediction.17
Table 6 adds considerable flexibility to the ways in which inflation can affect
wage changes, as well as controls for unemployment and productivity.  The bottom row
shows that the addition of these terms does improve the fit of the equations, but by less
than half in all cases.  Thus, the level of inflation alone is a key element in predicting the
size wage changes among quantiles.  Crucially, the first row of the table shows that the
basic decline in sensitivity to inflation as wage shocks get worse is maintained in the
more complex model.
Accelerating and decelerating inflation, per se, also have modest effects on the
distribution of wage changes.  For any given inflation level, if inflation has just
decreased, the wage distribution will be narrower than it would have been otherwise.
Raises of most workers are essentially insensitive to inflation drops in the first year after
inflation declines.  That is, the sum of the two coefficients on CPI and its negative change
is close to zero for the 25
th, median and higher quantiles.  The workers in the 10
th
percentile, however, actually gain higher raises than they would have under last year’s
inflation rate, all else being equal.  Thus, inflation decreases tend to narrow the
distribution of wage changes.
Inflation increases are associated with additional wage gains in all quantiles.
These bonuses are smallest for the median (0.377), but higher for workers at both
extremes.  Since the bonus coefficient for the 90
th percentile (0.507) is smaller than the
gain for the 10
th percentile (0.792), inflation increases moderately narrow the distribution
of wage changes, all else being equal.
That is, while higher inflation rates widen the distribution, either increases or
decreases modestly narrow the distribution in the year they are sustained.18
By contrast to the higher sensitivity of upper quantile wage gains to inflation
levels, unemployment exerts most of its influence on the lower quantiles of wage growth.
High unemployment depresses wage gains sharply in the bottom quantiles, with little
effect on upper quantile raises.  The coefficient of 0.701 on unemployment for the 10
th
percentile predicts that wage gains in the bottom decile will be 0.7 percentage points
lower if unemployment is one percentage point lower, all else being equal.  The opposite-
signed coefficients on change in unemployment suggest that the effect of unemployment
on wage growth is subject to a lag.
Finally, the results for our proxy for productivity growth show a non-linear
relationship with wage changes at all quantiles.  The coefficients for output-per-hour are
positive with little variation among quartiles.  This suggests that when productivity
growth is slow, workers receive 30 to 50 percent of productivity gains in their paychecks.
The coefficients on the quadratic term, however, suggest that this effect is attenuated
when productivity growth is fastest.  Nevertheless, workers in the lowest quantile (with
its coefficient of –5.060) may benefit more from higher productivity than do the upper
quantiles, narrowing wage adjustment distributions when productivity growth is faster.
Are these differences statistically significant?  Testing for heteroscedasticity in
wage changes according to the level of inflation yields a strong rejection of the null
hypothesis.  Despite the inclusion of controls for the direction of inflation changes and
other business cycle factors, the Koenker-Basset test for heteroscedasticity yields values
well beyond conventional levels of statistical significance.
Summarizing broadly, the highest wage changes in a year increase with inflation.
Wage changes at the lower tails, however, are more influenced by the unemployment rate.19
Given statistical significance of these differences, we now turn to the question of whether
the effects are economically relevant.
Isolating Factors’ Effects on the Distribution of Wage Changes
Since the model estimated in Table 6 is complex, we construct some illustrative
scenarios to gauge the total impact of inflation and unemployment on wage changes.




percentiles.  For each percentile, we plot predicted values of wage changes (shown as
circles), given realized inflation rates and constant unemployment and productivity
growth for the sample period.  We also overlay the actual values for the percentile (the
line without circles).  For the median and 90
th quantile, the fit is very close—information
on inflation alone is sufficient to produce a reasonably close fit.  The fit is markedly
worse for 10
th percentile wages, however.  Until the mid-1970s, wage growth at the
bottom is underpredicted.  Then the model overpredicts wage changes until the late
1980s.  This figure illustrates the points that median and upper tail wage changes are
highly responsive to the inflationary environment—much more so than are wage changes
at the lower tails.
Most strikingly, however, this figure shows that the response of the various
quantiles to inflation captures most of the path of the dispersion of wage shock over time.
Thus, inflation can be seen as the main driving factor in the variation of wage shocks over
time.20
Figure 4 illustrates the point further by showing how the full set of quantiles in
Table 6 would respond to a hypothetical inflation path.  Suppose that over a forty-year
span, inflation started at zero, then rose by one percentage point per year until it reached
fifteen percent at year sixteen.  After being stable at fifteen percent for four more years,
then it fell by one percent per year, until it reached zero at year 36 and was stable until
year 40.  Figure 4 shows the five predicted paths of quantile wage changes for this
scenario.  The contrast among the paths is quite stark.  The higher the quantile, the more
responsive wages are to inflation.  Indeed, wages in the 10
th percentile show very little
response at all.
 
We now repeat these exercises to illustrate the impact of unemployment.  The
exercise shown in Figure 5 is analogous to that in Figure 3, but with inflation held
constant and the unemployment rate allowed to follow its historical path from 1957 to
1996.  Again, the line with the circles shows the model predictions under these
circumstances, while the unmarked line represents actual values.  Overall, the relationship
with unemployment is a less accurate predictor of quantile wage changes than is inflation.
In contrast however, variations in unemployment predicting wage changes do much better
for the 10
th decile than they do for the median or 90
th percentile.
Figure 6 constructs a hypothetical scenario to illustrate the differing
responsiveness of wage change deciles to unemployment paths.  In this exercise, we begin
with an unemployment rate of four percent, raise it by 0.5 percentage points per year until
it reaches ten percent.  Then we hold it steady for five years, followed by a 0.5 percentage21
point per year drop until it reaches four percent and stays constant for ten years.  Again,
the contrast in responsiveness among the quantiles is stark.  But unemployment (in
contrast to inflation) has its most potent impact on the lowest quantiles of wage changes.
The median shows very little response, and the 90
th percentile even has a counterintuitive
pattern—albeit a muted one.
These figures highlight the differing responses of the quantiles to inflation and
unemployment shock.   They illustrate the generalization that wage gains of those in the
higher quantiles rise steadily with inflation, while wage gains of those in the lower tails
(that is, those suffering the largest negative shocks) are determined mostly by the
unemployment rate.  They also show that during the period from 1957 to 1996, inflation
was the main determinant of the dispersion of wage shocks.
The finding that the impact of these factors on wage changes varies substantially
by quantile suggests that even our relatively detailed model of how wages react to
inflation and other business-cycle variables doesn’t capture all of the important issues.
Indeed, a complete econometric model would need to predict widely varying levels of
matching nominal wage growth to inflation and employer responsiveness to general
slackness in the labor market.  Nonetheless, this statistical representation of wage change
provides a useful description of typical patterns.
Rising Earnings Inequality?
The path of inflation is not the only systematic trend that might affect
compensation.  Many researchers have documented a substantial increase in earnings
inequality in the United States during the period studied.  This rise in inequality also22
occurs in the CSS (Groshen 1991).  While this increasing inequality must be reflected in
wage changes, the exact nature of the relationship is unclear.  Perhaps rising inequality
raises the variance of wage changes because the distribution of desired wages is more
dispersed, allowing for larger possible changes.  Or, wage adjustments might be larger
during periods when some shock to the labor market is increasing inequality.  In addition,
it is possible that inequality rose in ways that did not affect the distribution of wage
changes.  For example, the correlation of individual wage changes over time might rise,
leaving the size distribution of wage changes unaffected.
Given our focus on inflation, the rise in earnings inequality argues for conducting
probes with suitable control variables.  To this end we reestimate our quantile regressions
with controls for the ratios of median earnings of workers of different education levels.
This measure of inequality is available back further than other inequality series.  In
addition, these ratios are highly correlated with the variance of log wages over the period
when microdata is available (starting in 1972).
10
The two included wage ratios are college graduates versus high school graduates
and high school graduates versus high school dropouts.  The CSS includes occupations
that employ workers at each of these three levels, although it is slanted toward more
skilled occupations.  Since we are uncertain about how rising earnings inequality alters
the distribution of wage changes, we introduce controls for both the level and the
percentage change in the education wage differentials.
                                                
10 Schweitzer (1997) shows that educational differentials are the most substantial measured factor
in the rise in earnings inequality.23
Adding these earnings inequality variables to the previous estimates is intended to
show what relationships are robust to the inclusion of these variables.  Table 7 shows the
results.
First, we note that differences in the estimated wage changes by quantile remain.




th percentiles continues to be significant, because the difference in
the coefficient estimates at the 75
th and 50
th percentiles are still large.  Thus, control for
inequality adds support to the conclusion that the wage change distribution reacts
nonuniformly to labor market shocks.
Nevertheless, wage inequality does appear to influence the distribution of wage
changes.  Coefficient estimates on the inequality measures are significantly different from
zero in almost all quantiles.  Inclusion of the level of wage inequality and its trend
improve the fit of the quantile regressions (the psuedo-R
2s rise) in Table 6.  The fit of the
upper half of the distribution is improved more substantially by the inclusion of inequality
controls than is the fit in the lower half.
In addition, although most signs on the coefficients estimated in Table 6 are
preserved, some point estimates change markedly.  Two general patterns stand out.  First,
including inequality controls does not substantially alter the role of inflation on wage
changes.  While the coefficients on the level of inflation for the lower quantiles are now
larger, they remain smaller than those of the high quantiles.  Furthermore, the size of the
negative coefficients on their quadratic terms also are substantially larger.  Similarly, the
impact of sharp changes in the inflation rate on wage changes is changed little for
decreases and slightly muted for increases.  Replicated Figures 2, 3 and 4 using the24
inflation coefficients from Table 7 are parallel those shown above, although muted
differences in the response to inflation between upper and lower quantiles are evident in
the analog to Figure 3.
Second, both the productivity and unemployment variables appear to be more
heavily related to the inclusion of inequality in their impacts on the distribution than does
inflation.  Coefficient changes were larger and their patterns were more strongly altered.
Overall, inequality controls do not remedy the inability of a single equation model
(of the type estimated here) to describe the factors that determine wage adjustments
consistently across the distribution of wage adjustments.  These controls do point out a
relationship between unemployment and productivity variables and the rise of inequality
in the United States.  This interesting, but possibly spurious, relationship suggests an area
for further study.
Two Policy-Relevant Questions
Are there Bellwether Jobs?
One possible explanation for the finding that wage changes are highly variable is
that the wage adjustments of certain occupations, employers, or occupation-employer
cells are continually more responsive to inflation than are others.  The CSS measures
wages in non-production occupations with the thickest, best-defined, inter-industry
markets.  Thus, it should capture mobile workers—those likely to be most sensitive to
market conditions.  In addition, the large employers in the CSS are arguably more able to25
track relevant market changes than smaller employers.  For monitoring and policy
purposes, tracking bellwether jobs could provide useful signals of inflationary pressures.
To investigate whether such bellwether jobs are likely to exist, we look for
evidence of serial correlation in wage changes within and between types of inflationary
episodes.  Table 8 presents the results.  The top panel focuses on the three periods of
stable inflation during our sample time frame.  The stability during these times provides a
basis for comparison for the periods of rising and falling inflation.  The first four columns
present correlation coefficients between consecutive years during these three episodes.
Were the majority of divergences in wage changes during these periods reflective of long-
term divergent trends in occupation or employer differentials, these correlations would be
positive—an above-average change during one year is likely to be followed by a similar
one during the next year.  On the other hand, if they reflected errors and corrections, or
normal compositional changes in the workforce (promotions, hires, etc.) the correlations
would be negative: An unusually big average increase in one year is likely to be followed
by a below-average adjustment next year.
During the stable periods, most (five out of eight) of the one-year correlations are
statistically significant and negative, suggesting the importance of error, corrections and
compositional shifts in the wage changes we observe.  Across episodes, the correlations
are essentially zero, suggesting that no particular type of job tends to benefit (or lose out)
more than others during periods of stable inflation.
The middle panel repeats the exercise for periods of increasing inflation during
the sample years.  Again, most of the correlations are statistically significant and26
negative—providing no evidence in support of bellwether jobs.  Indeed, it looks as
though deviations from the median during rising inflation are even more likely to be
compensated for later on than if they occur during periods of stability.  And across
episodes, jobs that were early, fast movers in one period of inflation are if anything, less
likely to lead the way during subsequent episodes.
The bottom panel looks at periods of declining inflation.  When inflation is
declining, the evidence of mean reversion seen in the upper two panels is attenuated.
Most of the correlation coefficients are small and poorly identified, suggesting an even
more random process.  And again, across episodes, there is no evidence to suggest the
existence of bellwether jobs.
Thus, the evidence thus far argues strongly against the existence of bellwether
jobs whose wage changes could signal inflationary changes.  If bellwether jobs exist, they
are a very small proportion of jobs in occupations or firms typical of the CSS.  That is,
they may be in smaller firms, or in production occupations, for example.  In the CSS,
being out on a tail is often preceded or followed by an opposite-tail wage change during
the previous or following year.  Which jobs land in one of the tails appears to be
idiosyncratic, however, rather than a permanent feature of the job.
Are the 90s Different?
Our last empirical exercise examines whether the wage changes during the 1990s
deviated from historical patterns, as some analysts suggest.  We compare the actual path
of wage change quantiles during the 1990s to predictions based on the historical model
estimated in Table 6.  We want to see if the lower quantiles had much less wage growth27
during the 1990s than expected, given the underlying rates of inflation, productivity and
unemployment.
Figure 7 shows the results of the exercise.  Each quantile is represented with two
lines: its actual wage change (the unmarked line) and the model prediction (the line with
circles).  For most of the period, the model fits quite well.  Only for 1994, 1995 and 1996
does the model miss much.  During those years, the actual wage change was lower than
the model predicted for the 10
th percentile wage change by one to two percentage points.
For the other parts of the distribution, the model performs quite well.  Thus, the evidence
of a sea change in wage-setting behaviors finds little support in the CSS so far.
Conclusions
We have examined the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Community Salary
Survey from 1957 to 1996 for the impact of inflation on the size of good or bad wage
shocks.  Most importantly, our exploratory exercise uncovers strong evidence that the
pattern of wage changes is not neutral with respect to inflation and other economic
conditions.
This finding suggests that the influence of errors and corrections, nominal
rigidities, or business cycle influences on wage-setting varies substantially within the
labor market.  These regularities provide a new window for comparing the behavior of
wages with model predictions in our competitive economy.  In particular, we find that28
representative or aggregate agent models abstract from important determinants of wage
changes.
We summarize our main findings as follows:
1.  The dominant factor in predicting the distribution of wage changes is the
inflationary environment.  In particular, wage change dispersion is higher if
inflation is higher because:
·  The magnitude of the best (highest) wage shocks in any year rises almost
one-for-one with the level of inflation.
·  The lowest wage changes in any year do not rise much with inflation.
2.  Other factors (including unemployment, inequality, and productivity growth)
also affect the dispersion of wage changes.  In particular:
·  Bad wage shocks are mitigated when unemployment is low.
In addition, from a monetary policy or monitoring perspective, we add two
intriguing findings:
1.  Wage changes are slightly negatively autocorrelated over time.
·  Negative autocorrelations refute the notion of bellwether jobs (i.e.,
occupations or firms that regularly lead the way when prices rise) and
suggests that inflation causes errors and corrections.
·  Small autocorrelations refute the existence of a permanent competitive
fringe of firms or occupations and suggests that many jobs sustain
occasional wage shocks.
2.  There are no apparent changes in the early 1990s.  The pattern of
wage growth was predictable for the low levels of inflation and
unemployment during the period.
Under standard models of wage determination, many of these findings are
puzzling.  As such, they open the door to new areas for exploration.  The next steps are to
examine other wage data to confirm the patterns visible here, to refine our understanding29
of the patterns, and to test the predictions of particular variants of wage-setting models
against observed patterns.30
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Description of the Annual Wage Adjustment Data Set
Drawn from the CSS, 1957-1996
Total Number of Job-Cell Wage Adjustments Observed 73,094
Number of Years of Changes 39
Average Number of Observations Per Year 1,874
Mean Log Wage Adjustment 0.048
Standard Deviation of Log Wage Adjustment 0.086
Note:  All numbers reported are for the first-differenced data set.
Source:  Authors' calculations from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Community Salary Survey.Table 2
Description of CSS Data by Year
End Number of: Mean Log Wage Adjustment in:
Year Job cells Occupations* Employers Cleveland Cincinnati Pittsburgh
1958  1,557    94    83  0.049 0.054  0.050
1959  1,714   103    88  0.040 0.048  0.070
1960  1,669   103    86  0.036 0.032  0.034
1961  1,701   103    88  0.039 0.035  0.036
1962  1,881   109    93  0.024 0.022  0.024
1963  1,910   112    90  0.019 0.026  0.024
1964  2,032   113    96  0.026 0.022  0.023
1965  2,123   124    95  0.021 0.026  0.010
1966  1,965   125    89  0.040 0.045  0.038
1967  1,967   125    89  0.037 0.042  0.035
1968  2,128   124    94  0.046 0.044  0.042
1969  1,972   114    97  0.066 0.050  0.049
1970    853    49    36  0.068 ** **
1971    854    49    36  0.061 ** **
1972  1,262    66    38  0.061 ** **
1973  1,477    90    57  0.056 0.095 **
1974  1,335    96    73  0.126 0.084  0.139
1975  1,379   101    73  0.074 0.063  0.090
1976  1,391   104    72  0.065 0.057  0.078
1977    789    60    72  0.030 0.021  0.052
1978  1,674   197    68  0.052 0.063  0.066
1979  2,418   267    75  0.064 0.071  0.069
1980  2,689   295    79  0.095 0.074  0.087
1981  2,196   186    83  0.086 0.089  0.059
1982  2,185   193    82  0.072 0.092  0.078
1983  2,013   190    75  0.050 0.055  0.073
1984  2,274   213    80  0.047 0.058  0.063
1985  2,272   212    79  0.040 0.044  0.042
1986  2,396   220    82  0.042 0.044  0.037
1987  2,437   226    80  0.031 0.037  0.038
1988  2,401   222    82  0.036 0.037  0.023
1989  2,407   225    81  0.045 0.041  0.036
1990  2,505   222    84  0.052 0.046  0.024
1991  2,536   223    89  0.038 0.045  0.035
1992  2,398   223    84  0.039 0.042  0.043
1993 2,355 223 89  0.032 0.026  0.040
1994 2,128 223 84  0.027 0.029  0.025
1995 1,841 241 69  0.027 0.031  0.019
1996 1,345 240 51  0.040 0.032  0.030
* Occupations are counted separately for each city.
** In 1970-72, the CSS is missing Cincinnati; in 1970-73, the CSS is missing Pittsburgh.
Source: Authors' calculations from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Community Salary Survey, 1956-
1996.Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations of CSS Wage Adjustment Components













College to High School Wage Premium 0.545 0.156
High School to Less than High School Premium 0.337 0.134
Percentage Change in College to HS Wage 2.18 7.38
Percentage Change in HS to Less than HS Wage 2.78 9.01
a
Change during salary survey year in the BLS Consumer Price Index for all Urban
Workers (CPI-U) for the US.
b
 Change during salary survey year in the BLS Nonfarm Business Sector Output per
Hour Worked.
c
US civilian unemployment rate.
Sources: Authors' calculations from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Community Salary Survey, 1957-1996.  US Bureau of Labor Statistics.Table 4
Classification of Sample Years by Inflation Direction and Episode
Year Inflation
Inflation
Change Direction of Inflation* Episodes of Inflation**
(CPI) (DCPI) Stable Increase Decrease Stable Increase Decrease
58 0.036 0.000 ·
59 0.004 -0.033 ·
60 0.015 0.012 ·
61 0.015 -0.001 ··
62 0.011 -0.004 ··
63 0.011 0.000 ··
64 0.014 0.003 ··
65 0.012 -0.002 ··
66 0.028 0.016 ·
67 0.026 -0.002 ·
68 0.039 0.014 ··
69 0.053 0.013 ··
70 0.061 0.008 ··
71 0.044 -0.017 ··
72 0.035 -0.010 ··
73 0.048 0.013 ··
74 0.108 0.059 ··
75 0.079 -0.029 ··
76 0.055 -0.024 ··
77 0.064 0.009 ··
78 0.085 0.021 ··
79 0.118 0.034 ··
80 0.153 0.035 ··
81 0.106 -0.047 ··
82 0.072 -0.034 ··
83 0.025 -0.047 ··
84 0.047 0.023 ·
85 0.036 -0.011 ··
86 0.016 -0.020 ··
87 0.038 0.022 ·
88 0.039 0.001 ·
89 0.050 0.011 ·
90 0.048 -0.002 ··
91 0.044 -0.005 ··
92 0.032 -0.012 ·
93 0.028 -0.003 ··
94 0.028 -0.001 ··
95 0.028 -0.000 ··
96 0.030 0.002 ··
* An increase in inflation is defined as an increase in DCPI equal to or larger than 0.5%.
Likewise, a decrease in inflation is defined as a decrease in DCPI equal to or less than 0.5%.
** An episode of inflation stability is defined as a period of two or more consecutive years when
inflation was stable.  Similarly, an episode of increasing (decreasing) inflation is defined as two
or more consecutive years of increasing (decreasing) inflation.Table 5
Simple Quantile Regressions for Total Cell Mean Wage Changes in the CSS








Inflation 0.949 0.707 0.555 0.432 0.067
CPI (0.020) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.023)
Constant 0.084 0.049 0.025 -0.001 -0.034
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Pseudo R
2 0.060 0.065 0.046 0.015 0.000
Koenker-Basset c




Number of observations = 73,094Table 6
Quantile Regressions for Total Cell Mean Wage Changes in the CSS
With contols for Productivity and Unemployment








Inflation 0.962 0.766 0.634 0.547 0.216
CPI (0.069) (0.030) (0.017) (0.011) (0.086)
Inflation Squared -0.011 -0.010 -0.008 -0.015 -0.016
100*(CPI)
2 (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Decreasing Inflation -0.896 -0.913 -0.684 -0.558 -0.662
(DCPI£-0.05)*DCPI (0.078) (0.033) (0.019) (0.013) (0.097)
Increasing Inflation 0.507 0.628 0.377 0.448 0.792
(DCPI³0.05)*DCPI (0.102) (0.044) (0.026) (0.018) (0.131)
Unemployment Rate 0.182 -0.105 -0.049 -0.250 -0.701
(0.057) (0.025) (0.015) (0.010) (0.070)
Change in -0.051 0.075 0.142 0.380 0.736
Unemployment Rate (0.098) (0.042) (0.025) (0.016) (0.121)
Productivity Growth 0.371 0.479 0.478 0.381 0.410
DOutput/Hour (0.123) (0.052) (0.030) (0.020) (0.154)
Prod. Growth Sqd. -0.087 -0.096 -0.108 -0.090 -0.051
100*(DOutput/Hour)
2 (0.030) (0.013) (0.007) (0.005) (0.037)
Constant 0.062 0.041 0.019 0.007 -0.007
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Pseudo R
2 0.071 0.081 0.060 0.022 0.007
Koenker-Basset c




Number of observations = 73,094Table 7
Quantile Regressions for Total Cell Mean Wage Changes in the CSS,
Including Inequality Variables








Inflation 0.819 0.830 0.737 0.767 0.553
CPI (0.078) (0.036) (0.019) (0.051) (0.086)
Inflation Squared 0.006 -0.010 -0.011 -0.022 -0.031
100*(CPI)
2 (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005)
Decreasing Inflation -1.297 -0.986 -0.743 -0.680 -0.522
(DCPI£-0.05)*DCPI (0.100) (0.044) (0.023) (0.064) (0.110)
Increasing Inflation 0.405 0.393 0.217 0.317 0.591
(DCPI³0.05)*DCPI (0.103) (0.048) (0.026) (0.061) (0.118)
Unemployment Rate 0.335 0.217 -0.202 -0.029 -0.226
(0.089) (0.041) (0.022) (0.051) (0.098)
Change in -0.700 -0.285 0.151 -0.027 0.506
Unemployment Rate (0.151) (0.069) (0.037) (0.108) (0.167)
Productivity Growth -0.116 0.080 0.225 0.170 0.173
DOutput/Hour (0.137) (0.062) (0.033) (0.080) (0.152)
Prod. Growth Sqd. 0.026 -0.037 -0.066 -0.042 -0.027
100*(DOutput/Hour)
2 (0.035) (0.015) (0.008) (0.021) (0.037)
Col. to H.S. 0.053 0.008 0.016 0.036 0.022
Ratio of median wage (0.017) (0.008) (0.004) (0.011) (0.019)
D Col. to H.S. -0.070 -0.038 -0.026 -0.007 0.021
D Ratio of median wage (0.020) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012)
H.S. to Dropout -0.063 -0.052 -0.052 -0.071 -0.093
Ratio of median wage (0.023) (0.010) (0.006) (0.016) (0.026)
D H.S. to Dropout 0.042 0.018 -0.010 -0.007 0.010
D Ratio of median wage (0.008) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.009)
Constant 0.046 0.036 0.011 -0.010 -0.023
(0.008) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.009)
Pseudo R
2 0.075 0.086 0.063 0.023 0.008
Koenker-Basset c




Number of observations = 71,537Table 8
Spearman Rank Order Correlations of Wage Changes Across Years,
by Type of Inflationary Episode































































































































































Inflation + Productivity Growth
CPI-U Inflation
CSS Mean Wage Change
This figure shows annualized percentage change by salary survey year, which is not always equal to 12 months.  Notably in 1974.Figure 2: Distribution of Log Wage Changes, from 1957 to 1996
Percentiles of Cell Wage Changes vs. Inflation




















20Figure 3: Scenario 1, Model Predictions when only Inflation Rate Varies




















20Figure 4: Scenario 2, Model Predictions for Rising and Falling Inflation Rate




















20Figure 5: Scenario 3, Model Predictions when only Unemployment Rate Varies




















20Figure 6: Scenario 4, Model Predictions for Rising and Falling Unemployment Rate
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